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1. Introduction 
The financial sector plays a crucial role in the operation of most economies, as it provides 
intermediation between borrowers and lenders of funds. To the extent that financial 
intermediaries are efficient institutions for channeling funds from savers to borrowers, they can 
affect investment decisions and economic growth.  
The theoretical framework of Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) provides some insights on the determination of deposit and lending 
interest rates. These are “retail” interest rates affected by the supply of deposits and demand for 
loans, and (within an imperfectly competitive banking sector) also by an exogenous inter-bank or 
money market (“wholesale”) rate. The theory suggests that both the lending and deposit interest 
rates maintain a stable long-run equilibrium relationship with the interbank rate, in the sense that 
these variables exhibit a systematic co-movement over time. In the short run, however, 
equilibrium may fail to hold because economies constantly experience shocks and other 
disturbances, although economic forces do not allow for these short-run deviations from 
equilibrium to grow indefinitely over time.  
An interesting question that arises is that of the type of adjustment back to equilibrium, and in 
particular the possibility of linear versus non-linear type of adjustments. Using US cross-sectional 
studies, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) provide several reasons for 
asymmetric adjustments of deposit and lending rates such as (i) collusive pricing arrangements 
and (ii) adverse customer reaction. First, consider the collusion hypothesis. In concentrated 
markets, banks find it costly to deviate from collusive pricing behavior. The costs are higher (a) 
for lending rate decreases because of lower payments received by borrowers, and (b) for deposit 
rate increases because of extra payments that have to be made to depositors. Therefore, the 
collusion hypothesis points to greater rigidity for lending rate decreases and deposit rate 
increases. Next, consider the adverse customer reaction hypothesis. Banks may be concerned 
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about negative reactions from customers following increases of lending rates and decreases of 
deposit rates. If this is the case, lending (deposit) rates should be upwards (downwards) rigid. 
Amongst the most recent studies, Scholnick (1996a,b) fails to reject the hypothesis of collusion 
for the emerging markets of Malaysia and Singapore. Frost and Bowden (1999) find asymmetries 
in the relationship between mortgage and bank bill rates for New Zealand, whereas Lim (2001) 
finds rigidities both in lending and deposit rate increases for Australia.  
Our aim is to test for and model non-linearities in the lending and deposit interest rates in two 
emerging market economies: Colombia and Mexico. We characterize the behavior of the interest 
rates using the Smooth Transition Autoregressive model (thereafter STAR; see e.g. Teräsvirta 
and Anderson, 1992; Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993). In a recent survey of STAR models and their 
applications, van Dijk et al. (2002) point out that this form of non-linear models has mainly been 
applied to macroeconomic time series and only recently to long and short-term interest rates in 
developed countries (see e.g. Anderson, 1997 for the US; van Dijk and Franses, 2000 for the 
Netherlands). The STAR model can be interpreted as a regime-switching model, where the 
transition from one regime to the other occurs in a smooth way. Assuming that the transition 
mechanism is controlled by the interest rate spread, we can differentiate between the impact of 
the spread on lending and deposit interest rates during periods of inefficiency in banking 
activities and/or periods of financial crises (when the spread is too high), and its impact on 
lending and deposit rates during periods of increasing banking competition and/or “normal” times 
(when the spread is low).1 Furthermore, we can identify threshold levels for the spread rate that 
mark the transition from one regime to the other, as well as the speed at which this transition 
takes place. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background to the 
                                                 
1 Another reason that may help explain high interest rate spreads is the extent of deposit account dollarization which 
tends to increase during financial crises. On the positive association between spreads and dollarization see Honohan 
and Shi (2002).  
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behavior of interest rates in Latin America. Section 3 introduces the theoretical aspects of non-
linear models in the context of the STAR methodology. Section 4 estimates linear and non-linear 
models for the lending and deposit rates in Latin America. Section 5 presents a discussion of our 
findings and section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Historical context 
For decades, Latin American economies pursued inward-looking development strategies in 
which government intervention was predominant. Consequently, these economies were 
characterized by the use of trade barriers and foreign exchange controls to protect indigenous 
infant industries against foreign competition, and by heavily controlled financial systems that 
resulted in financial repression. Financial repression is a term that refers to a policy regime in 
which high reserve requirements are imposed on financial intermediaries as well as ceilings on 
their deposit and lending interest rates. In addition to these features, there are restrictions on 
competition in the banking industry and on the composition of bank portfolios. The former takes 
the form of entry barriers into the banking system and public ownership of financial institutions; 
the latter consists of the operation of non-price mechanisms of credit allocation in the form of 
directed lending to specific productive sectors (Agénor and Montiel, 1996). 
During the 1980s, Mexico and Colombia saw considerable financial repression. Following the 
debt crisis of 1982 in Mexico, all Mexican banks were nationalized, and the government imposed 
high reserve requirements, set ceilings on interest rates, and directed lending to specific “high 
priority” productive sectors (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). Colombia entered the 1980s 
facing the collapse of coffee prices (i.e. the country’s main export product and an important 
determinant of its business cycle), along with a deteriorating situation of government finances. 
Montenegro (1983) argues that the financial crisis of the early 1980s can be explained, to a great 
extent, by this economic downturn. The crisis hit strongly poorly capitalized banks as well as 
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small banks, all of which suffered from loan portfolios concentrated on unprofitable firms often 
belonging to the owners of the banks. This last aspect also reflects a system where the operations 
of financial intermediaries were not properly supervised and regulated by the authorities.2 
During the 1990s, Latin American economies adopted policy reforms aimed at providing a 
transition to a more liberalized domestic financial sector. Policy reforms in Colombia and Mexico 
included measures to ease entry for new intermediaries, simplify legal reserve requirements and 
accelerate the privatization of government-controlled firms (see e.g. Barajas et. al., 1999; 
Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). These liberalizing efforts appear to have had a different impact 
on the market structure of the two countries. Indeed, in 1990, the banking systems in Colombia 
and Mexico were highly concentrated, as the top three banks held about 56 percent and 66 
percent of total assets, respectively. Between 1997 and 2001, these figures stood at an average 29 
percent for Colombia and almost twice as much (56 percent) for Mexico.3 
The liberalization process was tested in two occasions. The first one during the Mexican 
financial turmoil of 1994-1995 and the second one during the eruption of the severe financial 
crisis that hit the Asian economies in mid 1997 followed by global economic uncertainties in 
response to the Russian moratorium in mid 1998. As Brock and Suárez-Rojas (2000) point out, 
Latin American authorities responded to the financial crises of the 1990s by intensifying their 
efforts for deeper reforms, rather than turning back to government intervention policies that 
followed the failure of liberalization measures in the second half of the 1970s. 
The next section of the paper discusses the theory of regime-switching models in the context 
of the STAR methodology that will be empirically tested on the behavior of lending and deposit 
                                                 
2 In Colombia, banks were also subject to high rates of financial taxation, which provided an additional factor of 
financial repression. A description of the institutional background in the Colombian financial sector can be found in 
Barajas et al. (1999, 2000). 
3 Similar figures are obtained based on the deposits held by the top three banks. Concentration figures for 1990 were 
taken from the Financial Structure Database and assembled by Beck et al. (2001).  Figures for the 1997-2001 period 
are based on the authors’ calculations using data from the Superintendencia Bancaria of Colombia and the Comisión 
Nacional Bancaria y de Valores of Mexico. 
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interest rates in the Latin American economies. 
 
3. Specification of STAR models 
The STAR model of order k for a univariate time series yt is written as: 
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where µ1 and µ2 are intercept terms and εt ~ iid (0, σ2). G(st−d) is the transition function, which is 
assumed to be continuous and bounded between zero and one, and d is the delay parameter. The 
STAR model (1) can be considered as a regime-switching model which allows for two regimes, 
G(st−d) = 0 and G(st−d) = 1, respectively, where the transition from one to the other regime occurs 
in a smooth way. The regime that occurs at time t is determined by the transition variable st−d and 
the corresponding value of G(st−d). Different functional forms of G(st−d) allow for different types 
of regime-switching behavior. In particular, asymmetric adjustment to positive and negative 
deviations of st−d relative to a parameter c, can be obtained by setting G(st−d) equal to the 
‘logistic’ function: 
 
            (3.2a) ,0,)]}(/)(exp[1{),;( 1 >−−+= −−−− γσγγ dtdtdt scscsG
 
where σ(st−d) is the sample standard deviation of st−d. The parameter c is the threshold between 
the two regimes, in the sense that G(st−d) changes monotonically from 0 to 1 as st−d increases, 
while G(st−d) = 0.5 when st−d = c. The parameter γ determines the smoothness of the change in the 
value of the logistic function and thus the speed of the transition from one regime to the other. 
When γ → 0 the ‘logistic’ function equals a constant (i.e. 0.5), and when γ → ∞, the transition 
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from G(st−d) = 0 to G(st−d) = 1 is almost instantaneous at st−d = c. 
Another type of regime-switching behavior, which describes asymmetric adjustment to small 
and large absolute values of st−d, is obtained by setting G(st−d) equal to the ‘exponential’ function: 
 
.0)},(/)(exp{1),;( 22 >−−−= −−− γσγγ dtdtdt scscsG
 
A possible drawback of the ‘exponential’ function is that the model becomes linear if either γ →0 
or γ → ∞. To overcome this drawback, Jansen and Teräsvirta (1996) suggest specifying G(st−d) as 
the ‘quadratic logistic’ function: 
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In this case, if γ → 0, the model becomes linear, whereas if γ → ∞, G(st−d) is equal to 1 for 
st−d < c1 and st−d > c2, and equal to 0 in between. 
 
The estimation of STAR models consists of three steps: 
 
Step 1: Specify a linear autoregressive (AR) model as the base one. The model can be extended to 
allow for other exogenous variables as additional regressors. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
Step 2: Select the transition variable st−d and test linearity, for different values of the delay 
parameter d, against STAR models using the linear model specified in Step 1 as the null 
hypothesis. Linearity testing is based on a third-order Taylor approximation of the transition 
function around γ = 0. This results in estimating the auxiliary regression: 
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where vt are the residuals of the linear model of Step 1. The null hypothesis of linearity is 
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H0 : φ1,j = φ2,j = φ3,j = 0, for j = 1,…, k. This is a standard Lagrange Multiplier (LM) type test. To 
specify the value of the delay parameter d, model (3.3) is estimated for a number of different 
values of d, say d = 1,…, D. In cases where linearity is rejected for more than one values of d, the 
decision rule is to select d based on the lowest p-value of the linearity test. 
 
Step 3: Proceed by selecting the appropriate form of the transition function G(st−d), that is, select 
between the ‘logistic’ function (3.2a) and the ‘quadratic logistic’ function (3.2b). This is done by 
running a sequence of LM tests nested within the non-linear model (3.3) of Step 2, namely: 
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In this case, the decision rule is to select the ‘quadratic logistic’ function (3.2b) if the p-value 
associated with the Η02 hypothesis is the smallest one, otherwise select the ‘logistic’ function 
(3.2a).4 Having done that, proceed by estimating the STAR model (3.1), with the transition 
function G(st−d) specified based on the sequence of tests in (3.4). 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The data 
We use monthly data on the lending, deposit and inter-bank or money market (“wholesale”) 
interest rates for Colombia and Mexico. The Mexican data set is obtained from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics database and the Colombian dataset comes from the Colombian 
Banking Association (Asobancaria) and the IMF. Colombian data is from 1989:M1 to 2002:M7 
                                                 
4 Van Dijk and Franses (2000) motivate the sequence of tests in (3.4) on the grounds that if a ‘logistic’ alternative is 
appropriate, then the second order effect in the Taylor expansion should be zero, that is, φ2,j = 0. 
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and Mexican data is from 1993:M1 to 2002:M7. The sample choice is dictated by the availability 
of data in the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.  
Figure 1 plots the levels of the interest rates for the two emerging market economies. 
Estimation of linear and non-linear models requires stationarity of the interest rate series. Table 1 
reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on the levels and the first differences of the 
interest rates. ADF tests are also reported for the spread between the lending and interbank 
interest rates and the spread between the deposit and interbank rates. The results suggest that 
Colombian and Mexican interest rates are non-stationary (i.e. I(1)) in levels, whereas the spreads 
are found to be stationary (i.e. I(0)) for both countries. Based on the results of the unit root tests, 
linear and non-linear models are estimated for the first differences of the interest rates.5  
In the remaining of the paper we adopt the following notation for the interest rate series in the 
two emerging markets: COL_l, COL_d and COL_ib refer to the lending, deposit and interbank 
rates in Colombia. The spread between the lending and interbank rate is denoted by COL_cvl 
whereas COL_cvd is the spread between the deposit and interbank rate. MEX_l, MEX_d, 
MEX_ib, MEX_cvl and MEX_cvd refer to the corresponding series in Mexico.  
 
4.2 Testing for linearity and STAR model selection 
As discussed in section 3, the first step in deriving STAR models involves the estimation of 
linear interest rate models. The theoretical framework briefly discussed in section 1 suggests that 
changes in lending (deposit) rates are driven by the exogenous interbank interest rate and 
deviations from the long-run lending-interbank (deposit-interbank) interest rate relationship. In 
Table 2, we report unrestricted linear models with lag lengths, k, chosen by the Akaike and 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria, (AIC and BIC, respectively). The interest rate equations 
can be interpreted as error correction models; lending and deposit interest rate changes react to 
                                                 
5 Phillips-Perron tests give similar unit root results and are available by the authors on request. 
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the disequilibrium errors given by the (lagged) lending-interbank and deposit-interbank rates.6 
The diagnostic tests of the linear models in Table 2 show some evidence of ARCH effects and 
normality failures. The failure of the diagnostic tests in the linear models provides a further 
motivation for considering the possibility that the interest rates might be better characterized by a 
non-linear type of behavior rather than the linear one discussed above. 
Having estimated the base linear models, we move on to Step 2 of our methodology which 
involves testing for the existence of non-linear dynamics in the interest rate models for the two 
Latin American economies selecting the relevant interest rate spread as a possible transition 
variable st-d. 7 The empirical results of the LM-type tests for linearity (Steps 2 and 3 of section 3) 
are reported in Table 3. We set d equal to 1 through 6 (although the results are not affected even 
if we go up to d ). From Table 3A, the H12= 0 hypothesis is rejected most strongly both at d = 1 
and d = 3 for the Colombian lending rate equation and at d = 4 for the Mexican lending rate 
equation. Assuming d = 3 for Colombia and d = 4 for Mexico, the sequence of tests (H03, H02, and 
H01, respectively) in Table 3B choose the ‘logistic’ model (3.2a) as the appropriate transition 
function.8 The H0 hypothesis is rejected most strongly at d = 1 for the Colombian deposit rate 
equation and at d = 5 for the Mexican deposit rate equation (Table 3A). Given these choices, the 
sequence of tests in Table 3B favors the ‘logistic’ model (3.2a) as the appropriate transition 
function. To sum up, we choose the following transition variables: COL_cvlt-3 for the Colombian 
lending rate model, MEX_cvlt-4 for the Mexican lending rate model, COL_cvdt-1 for the 
Colombian deposit rate model and MEX_cvdt-5 for the Mexican deposit rate model. 
                                                 
6 Notice that the t-ratios (but not the coefficient estimates) on the spreads increase by estimating more parsimonious 
models using the general-to-specific-approach (which deletes one by one the most insignificant variables). A referee 
warned against estimating parsimonious linear models prior to conducting linearity tests because the tests will then 
fail to “pick up” various nonlinearities associated with the excluded variables. 
7 It could also be the case that regime switches are driven by macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates. If this 
is the case, one would expect that a measure of inflation could be the driving transition mechanism between regimes. 
We considered the use of differenced inflation as a representative indicator of macroeconomic causes of transition, 
but detailed empirical analysis (available on request) failed to find support for this idea. 
8 Given the choice of d = 3 for the Colombian lending rate, the sequence of tests in Table 3B slightly favors the 
‘quadratic’ model over the ‘logistic’ one, but we could not get sensible estimates for the former. We also estimated 
logistic and ‘quadratic’ models assuming d = 1, but the results were much less well determined. 
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4.3 Estimates of the non-linear models 
We estimate the STAR model (3.1) using the ‘logistic’ model (3.2a) by non-linear least 
squares (NLS). Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) stress particular problems 
like slow convergence or overestimation associated with estimates of the γ parameter. For this 
reason, we follow their suggestions in standardizing the exponent of the ‘logistic’ function (3.2a) 
by dividing it by the standard deviation of the transition variable, σ(st−d) so that γ becomes a 
scale-free parameter. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the NLS estimates of the parsimonious STAR interest rate models. The 
main parameters of interest in the STAR models are the estimated values of the threshold level, c, 
and the speed of adjustment, γ. The c estimates reported in Tables 4 to 5 are statistically 
significant in all models, whereas the estimates of the γ parameter are high for all models 
indicating that the speed of the transition from G(st-d; γ, c) = 0 to G(st-d; γ, c) = 1 is rapid at the 
estimated threshold c. This is evident from Figure 2, which plots the values of the estimated 
transition function against the spreads. Notice also the high standard error of the γ estimates 
reported in Tables 4-5. Teräsvirta (1994) and van Dijk et al. (2002) point out that this should not 
be interpreted as evidence of weak non-linearity. Accurate estimation of γ might be difficult as it 
requires many observations in the immediate neighborhood of the threshold c. Further, large 
changes in γ have only a small effect on the shape of the transition function implying that high 
accuracy in estimating γ is not necessary (see the discussion in van Dijk et al., 2002).  
From Tables 4 to 5, the non-linear models are preferred to the linear ones based on both the 
AIC and the BIC. In addition, the non-linear specification captures the ARCH effects that are 
present in the linear interest rate model for Colombia. Parameter stability tests (not reported but 
available on request) show that the estimates of our regime switching models are much more 
stable compared to those of the linear models.  
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5. Discussion of results 
Our research identified the existence of non-linear dynamics in the behavior of the lending and 
deposit interest rates for two emerging markets in Latin America. Moreover, these interest rates 
exhibit a regime-switching behavior according to the variation of the interest rate spread. The 
result confirms the importance of the spread rate as a factor affecting the evolution of the lending 
and deposit rates. Focusing on the lending/interbank rate differential, the regimes we identify 
have a plausible economic interpretation. The first regime, i.e. G(st-d; γ, c) = 1, is defined by 
positive values of the interest rate spread relative to the threshold. This may be identified with 
periods of inefficiency in banking activities which in turn adversely affect domestic savings and 
investments, or with periods of financial crises which tend to be characterized by large values of 
the interest rate spread. Conversely, the second regime, i.e. G(st-d; γ, c) = 0, is defined by periods 
during which the interest rate spread is less than a threshold. This may be identified with periods 
of modernization of the banking system which promotes competition within the banking sector, 
or with “normal” periods of time.  
Figure 3 plots the estimated transition functions against time in order to illustrate the 
succession of the regimes over the sample period. We report the transition functions governed by 
the lending/interbank rate differential that are easier to interpret. On the other hand, the transition 
functions governed by the deposit/interbank rate differential provide strong evidence in favor of 
intermediate regimes and very weak evidence of the extreme values of 0 and 1; however, these 
are available on request. The estimated transition function for the Colombian lending rate model 
classifies most of the sample period into the upper regime, which is consistent with the presence 
of inefficiencies in the banking system. This finding suggests that the policy reforms adopted 
since the early 1990s (e.g. easier entry for new intermediaries and privatization of public sector 
firms) have not improved substantially competition and efficiency in the banking system. This is 
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also discussed in Barajas et al. (1999, 2000) and Urrutia (2000) who point out that by 
international standards, bank intermediation spreads and overhead expenses in Colombia are on 
average around 2 percent higher than those in the rest of Latin America, and around 6 percent 
higher than those in industrialized countries.9  
For Mexico, classification most of the 1993-1997 into the upper regime reflects the profound 
financial crisis that affected the Mexican economy in the mid 1990s. Other reasons that might 
explain a high interest rate spread include (i) the extent of deposit account dollarization which 
tends to increase during periods of financial crises 10 (see e.g. Honohan and Shi, 2002) and (ii) the 
enforcement of bank capital asset requirements in 1993 which had a negative effect on the supply 
of bank loans (see Chiuri et al., 2002). Since 1998 however, the estimated transition function for 
Mexico classifies most of the sample period into the lower regime. This is consistent with the 
return to more “normal” periods of time.  
Our estimates in the left panels of Tables 4-5 for the lending rate equations allow for the 
behavior of the spread (between the lending and the interbank rate) to vary across regimes. By 
comparing the coefficients for the Colombian lending/interbank rate spread (i.e. COL_cvlt-1) in 
the two regimes (see left panel of Table 4) we see that when COL_cvlt-3 is below the threshold 
level of 12 percent, the lending interest rate adjusts relatively fast (i.e. the estimated coefficient 
equals –0.234). On the other hand, when COL_cvlt-3 is above 12 percent, the lending interest rate 
adjusts much slower (i.e. the estimated coefficient equals –0.159). From the left panel of Table 5, 
when the Mexican spread (i.e. MEX_cvlt-4) is below 3.7 percent, the lending rate adjusts fast (i.e. 
the estimated coefficient equals –0.592). On the other hand, no significant adjustment occurs 
                                                 
9 For their international comparisons, Barajas et al. (1999, 2000) and Urrutia (2000) examine three potential 
measures of efficiency: (i) the difference between the lending and deposit interest rates, (ii) the accounting value of a 
bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its total assets, and (iii) the accounting value of a bank’s overhead expenses 
as a share of its total assets.  
10 For Mexico, the average share of foreign currency deposits in M2 was 11% during the pre-financial crisis years of 
1990 to 1993. The share rose to around 17% during 1994 to 1996, and dropped to the pre-crisis level afterwards. The 
share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits followed a similar pattern of behavior. These figures are taken 
from Honohan and Shi (2002), Tables A1 and A2. 
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above equilibrium. For both countries, these spread asymmetries (below and above equilibrium) 
are statistically significant based on the F-version of the Wald test on equality of spread effects 
for the two regimes (see bottom line of Tables 4 and 5). For both countries and both regimes, 
significant effects from the corresponding interbank interest rates are recorded. 
The right panels of Tables 4 and 5 report the deposit rate equations allowing for the behavior 
of the spread (between the deposit and the interbank rate) to vary across regimes. For Colombia, 
there is fast error correction effect when the interest rate spread COL_cvdt-1 falls below –1.44 
percent (i.e. the estimated coefficient equals –0.449) and slow otherwise (i.e. the estimated 
coefficient equals –0.097). These asymmetries are statistical significant (see the bottom line of 
Table 4). For Mexico, there is some very weak error correction effect when the interest rate 
spread MEX_cvdt-5 falls below –7.54 percent (i.e. the estimated coefficient equals –0.015) and no 
effect otherwise. Significant interbank interest rate effects are recorded for both countries and 
both regimes. 
Overall, the results from Tables 4 and 5 show some similarities for both emerging market 
economies. We present evidence of greater rigidity for lending rate decreases and deposit rate 
decreases. Therefore, our results offer no clear support for either the hypothesis of collusive 
pricing arrangements in the banking sectors of Colombia and Mexico or the adverse customer 
reaction hypothesis. On the loan side, when the spread between the lending and interbank rate is 
below equilibrium, banks respond by increasing the lending rate rapidly. Further, when the 
deposit rate is below its equilibrium with the interbank rate, banks respond by increasing the 
deposit rate rapidly. A possible economic explanation for these results has to do with the 
investment opportunities available to domestic depositors abroad. In particular, financial 
liberalization has given domestic residents the opportunity to rebalance their portfolios 
internationally, achieving a convergence of domestic deposit rates (adjusted for expectations of 
exchange rate changes) towards international rates. To respond, it could be the case that domestic 
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banks in Colombia and Mexico attempt to keep domestic depositors at home by making deposit 
rates inflexible downwards. On the other hand, convergence of domestic and international 
lending rates is less likely to occur due to information costs associated with monitoring domestic 
borrowers. As a result, international capital markets do not lend directly to companies, rather, 
foreign lending is intermediated by domestic banks (see also Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000). 
Domestic banks in Colombia and Mexico are possibly exploiting this by making lending rates 
inflexible downwards. Notice also the lower interest rate spread effects in the Mexican compared 
with the Colombian deposit rate equation (see the right panels of Tables 4 and 5). Price rigidity in 
Mexico results from the high market concentration in the Mexican banking system discussed in 
section 2 (see also the discussion in Hannan and Berger, 1991). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we model the lending and deposit interest rates in two Latin American emerging 
markets using the smooth transition regime-switching framework. Allowing for different 
dynamic behavior depending upon large and small interest rate spreads, the non-linear 
specification seems to work well both in statistical and economic terms. In statistical terms, it 
captures most of the diagnostic test failures of the linear models. In economic terms, we find 
evidence of greater rigidity for lending rate decreases and deposit rate decreases. This could be 
due to the investment opportunities available to domestic depositors abroad following financial 
liberalization. To respond, it could be the case that domestic banks in Colombia and Mexico 
attempt to keep domestic depositors at home by making deposit rates inflexible downwards. On 
the other hand, information costs associated with monitoring domestic borrowers imply that 
convergence of domestic and international lending rates is less likely to occur. Domestic banks 
are possibly exploiting this by making lending rates inflexible downwards. Finally, price rigidity 
in Mexico results from the high market concentration in the Mexican banking system. 
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Table 1: Dickey and Fuller unit root tests for the interest rate series 
 
Variable Lags Cτ  Order of 
Integration 
    
COL_dt 1 -0.885 ( )1~ I  
COL_lt 3 -1.136 ( )1~ I  
COL_ibt 1 -2.170 ( )1~ I  
COL_cvdt = COL_dt   – COL_ibt 1 -6.099 **  ( )0~ I  
COL_cvlt = COL_lt   – COL_ibt 1 -5.450 ** ( )0~ I  
    
MEX_dt 1 -2.222 ( )1~ I  
MEX_lt 2 -2.562 ( )1~ I
( )
 
MEX_ibt 2 -2.480 1~ I
( )
 
MEX_cvdt  = MEX_dt   – MEX_ibt 0 -3.400 * 0~ I
( )
 
MEX_cvlt = MEX_lt   – MEX_ibt 0 -5.544 ** 0~ I  
Cτ  indicates that the Dickey-Fuller regression contains a constant. 
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
** indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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Table 2: Estimated linear models 
 
Colombia: Lending rate model Colombia: Deposit rate model 
∆COL_lt-1 -0.017 (0.079) ∆COL_dt-1 0.340 (0.077) 
∆COL_lt-2 -0.014 (0.074) ∆COL_dt-2 -0.200 (0.081) 
∆COL_lt-3 0.189 (0.074) ∆COL_dt-3 0.114 (0.080) 
∆COL_lt-4 0.063 (0.074) ∆COL_dt-4 -0.122 (0.080) 
∆COL_ibt 0.146 (0.021) ∆COL_dt-5 0.069 (0.067) 
∆COL_ibt-1 0.046 (0.038) ∆COL_ibt 0.163 (0.014) 
∆COL_ibt-2 0.045 (0.035) ∆COL_ibt-1 0.044 (0.032) 
∆COL_ibt-3 0.052 (0.032) ∆COL_ibt-2 0.047 (0.030) 
∆COL_ibt-4 0.022 (0.023) ∆COL_ibt-3 0.050 (0.027) 
COL_cvlt-1 -0.117 (0.036) ∆COL_ibt-4 0.082 (0.025) 
   ∆COL_ibt-5 0.044 (0.017) 
   COL_cvdt-1 -0.100 (0.032) 
      
ˆ lσ  1.414   0.946  
AIC 3.600   2.805  
BIC 3.811   3.058  
AR(12) 1.263 [0.248]  1.332 [0.208] 
ARCH(12) 5.056 [0.000]  3.101 [0.001] 
NORM(2) 136.380 [0.000]  44.163 [0.000] 
    
Mexico: Lending rate model Mexico: Deposit rate model 
∆MEX_lt-1 -0.166 (0.132) ∆MEX_dt-1 0.098 (0.093) 
∆MEX_lt-2 -0.581 (0.148) ∆MEX_dt-2 -0.166 (0.094) 
∆MEX_lt-3 -0.453 (0.149) ∆MEX_dt-3 0.050 (0.071) 
∆MEX_lt-4 -0.143 (0.123) ∆MEX_ibt 0.423 (0.016) 
∆MEX_ibt 0.938 (0.035) ∆MEX_ibt-1 0.118 (0.042) 
∆MEX_ibt-1 0.351 (0.131) ∆MEX_ibt-2 0.024 (0.044) 
∆MEX_ibt-2 0.472 (0.147) ∆MEX_ibt-3 0.036 (0.038) 
∆MEX_ibt-3 0.478 (0.137) MEX_cvdt-1 -0.026 (0.018) 
∆MEX_ibt-4 0.078 (0.117)    
MEX_cvlt-1 -0.148 (0.097)   
     
ˆ lσ  1.517   0.917   
AIC 3.777   2.743  
BIC 4.037   2.962  
AR(12) 1.535 [0.127]  1.306 [0.229] 
ARCH(12) 0.595 [0.840]  3.787 [0.000] 
NORM(2) 43.524 [0.000]  20.024 [0.000] 
Estimates of the constant terms are not reported. Standard errors in (•) 
and p-values in [•]. ˆ lσ : regression standard error. AIC: Akaike 
information criterion. BIC: Schwarz Bayesian information criterion. 
AR(12): F-test for up to 12th order serial correlation. ARCH(12): F-test  
for up to 12th order Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. 
NORM(2): Chi-square test for normality. 
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Table 3: Test for linearity and STAR model selection 
 
Panel A: Linearity tests 
 
Delay Colombia Mexico 
  Lending rate model Deposit rate model Lending rate model Deposit rate model 
 
d 
Transition variable: 
COL_cvlt-d 
Transition variable: 
COL_cvdt-d 
Transition variable:  
MEX_cvlt-d 
Transition variable: 
MEX_cvdt-d 
     
1 0.000000 0.000002 0.000005 0.002689 
2 0.000001 0.001270 0.000130 0.000009 
3 0.000000 0.000606 0.072997 0.000004 
4 0.000010 0.000022 0.000004 0.128496 
5 0.000015 0.000003 0.011405 0.000002 
6 0.000395 0.454903 0.000047 0.000063 
 
 
 
Panel B: STAR model selection 
 
Country and model Delay 
d 
0: ,303 =Η jφ  
0         
|0:
,3
,202
=
=Η
j
j
φ
φ
 
0         
|0:
,2,3
,101
==
=Η
jj
j
φφ
φ
 
Type of 
Model 
      
Colombia      
Lending rate model 3 0.006167 0.000001 0.055291 LSTAR 
Deposit rate model 1 0.034236 0.177982 0.000000 LSTAR 
      
Mexico      
Lending rate model 4 0.000377 0.007989 0.019665 LSTAR 
Deposit rate model 5 0.008685 0.057629 0.000018 LSTAR 
 
Notes: The Table reports the p-values of the linearity tests developed in section 3. Panel A 
reports the H0 test for linearity. Figures in bold denote the minimum probability value of the H0 
test over the interval 1 . Panel B reports the p-values of the nested H6≤≤ d 03, H02 and H01 tests 
for selecting between the ‘logistic’ model and the ‘quadratic logistic’ model for the transition 
function of the STAR models. Figures in bold denote the lowest p-value for the three tests.  All 
p-values refer to the F-version of the LM test. 
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Table 4: Estimated non-linear models for Colombia 
 
Lending rate model  Deposit rate model 
Transition variable: COL_cvlt-3  Transition variable: COL_cvdt-1 
Variable Coeff. (s.e.)  Variable Coeff. (s.e.)
      
eq.1   eq.1  
∆COL_lt-1 -0.097 (0.097)  ∆COL_dt-2 -0.480 (0.121)
∆COL_lt-3 0.128 (0.087)  ∆COL_ibt 0.189 (0.036)
∆COL_ibt 0.169 (0.027)  ∆COL_ibt-1 -0.179 (0.065)
∆COL_ibt-1 -0.054 (0.049)  ∆COL_ibt-2 -0.078 (0.035)
∆COL_ibt-2 -0.099 (0.039)  ∆COL_ibt-4 -0.072 (0.032)
COL_cvlt-1 -0.234 (0.043)  COL_cvdt-1 -0.449 (0.095)
       
eq.2   eq.2   
∆COL_lt-1 0.290 (0.119)  ∆COL_dt-1 0.349 (0.074)
∆COL_lt-3 0.147 (0.127)  ∆COL_dt-2 0.076 (0.089)
∆COL_lt-4 0.192 (0.143)  ∆COL_ibt 0.157 (0.017)
∆COL_ibt 0.125 (0.028)  ∆COL_ibt-1 0.049 (0.021)
∆COL_ibt-3 0.036 (0.039)  ∆COL_ibt-3 0.018 (0.016)
∆COL_ibt-4 0.028 (0.031)  ∆COL_ibt-4 0.064 (0.018)
COL_cvlt-1 -0.159 (0.029)  ∆COL_ibt-5 0.028 (0.014)
   COL_cvdt-1 -0.097 (0.030)
      
γ 60.961 (132.13)  γ 5.947 (3.760)
c  12.092 (0.208)  c  -1.443 (0.603)
      
ˆnlσ  1.347    0.868  
2 2ˆ ˆ/nl lσ σ  0.907    0.842  
AIC 3.504    2.637  
BIC 3.776   2.949 
AR(12) 1.081 [0.382]   1.4141 [0.168]
ARCH(12) 2.241 [0.014]   1.7799 [0.060]
NORM(2) 78.474 [0.000]   13.036 [0.002]
WALD 7.411 [0.007]   14.291 [0.000]
 
The Table reports NLS estimates of the LSTAR model  = (eq.1)(1 - G(•)) + (eq.2) G(•), 
where  = ∆COL_l
ty
ty t, ∆COL_dt, and G(•) = {1 + exp[− γ (st-d − c)/σ(st-d)]}-1 is the “logistic” 
transition function, with st-d as the transition variable. Estimates of the constant terms are not 
reported. Values of 0 and 1 of G(•) are associated with the two alternative regimes. The 
speed of transition between the two regimes is determined by the parameter γ, and c denotes 
the threshold between the two regimes. WALD is an F-test on equality of spread effects for 
the two regimes. Other diagnostic test statistics are described in the notes to Table 2. 
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Table 5: Estimated non-linear models for Mexico 
 
Lending rate model  Deposit rate model 
Transition variable: MEX_cvlt-4  Transition variable: MEX_cvdt-5 
Variable Coeff. (s.e.)  Variable Coeff. (s.e.)
      
eq.1   eq.1  
∆MEX_lt-3 0.287 (0.103)  ∆MEX_dt-1 0.225 (0.127)
∆MEX_lt-4 -0.030 (0.024)  ∆MEX_ibt 0.521 (0.049)
∆MEX_ibt 0.888 (0.031)  ∆MEX_ibt-1 -0.086 (0.086)
∆MEX_ibt-3 -0.288 (0.119)  MEX_cvdt-1 -0.015 (0.014)
MEX_cvlt-1 -0.592 (0.088)    
     
eq.2   eq.2  
∆MEX_lt-2 -0.795 (0.266)  ∆MEX_dt-1 -0.143 (0.106)
∆MEX_lt-3 -0.760 (0.182)  ∆MEX_dt-2 -0.155 (0.061)
∆MEX_ibt 1.176 (0.069)  ∆MEX_ibt 0.426 (0.018)
∆MEX_ibt-1 0.293 (0.098)  ∆MEX_ibt-1 0.307 (0.049)
∆MEX_ibt-2 0.674 (0.197)    
∆MEX_ibt-3 0.778 (0.170)    
MEX_cvlt-1 0.018 (0.079)     
     
γ 58.553 (28.094)  γ 8.469 (7.915)
c  3.723 (0.037)  c  -7.545 (0.733)
      
ˆnlσ  1.161    0.769  
2 2ˆ ˆ/nl lσ σ  0.586    0.703  
AIC 3.226    2.371  
BIC 3.546   2.592 
AR(12) 1.718 [0.078]   1.126 [0.350]
ARCH(12) 1.577 [0.118]   0.576 [0.855]
NORM(2) 11.270 [0.004]   25.027 [0.000]
WALD 30.379 [0.000]   1.291 [0.258]
 
The Table reports NLS estimates of the LSTAR model  = (eq.1)(1 - G(•)) + (eq.2) G(•), 
where  = ∆MEX_l
ty
ty t, ∆MEX_dt, and G(•) = {1 + exp[− γ (st-d − c)/σ(st-d)]}-1 is the “logistic” 
transition function, with st-d as the transition variable. Estimates of the constant terms are not 
reported. Values of 0 and 1 of G(•) are associated with the two alternative regimes. The 
speed of transition between the two regimes is determined by the parameter γ, and c denotes 
the threshold between the two regimes. WALD is an F-test on equality of spread effects for 
the two regimes. Other diagnostic test statistics are described in the notes to Table 2. 
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Figure 1: Interest rate series 
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Figure 2: Estimated transition functions versus transition variables 
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Mexico: Lending rate model Mexico: Deposit rate model 
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Estimated transition functions from the corresponding STAR models presented in Tables 4 and 5 
for Colombia and Mexico, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Estimated transition functions for the lending rate models against time  
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Estimated transition functions from the corresponding STAR 
lending rate models reported in the left panels of Tables 4 and 
5 for Colombia and Mexico, respectively. Extreme values of 0 
and 1 of the transition functions are associated with the two 
alternative regimes. 
 
 
